SARS is the first deadly infectious disease of the 21st century. It started in the Chinese province of Guangdong in November 2002, and by August 2003, it had spread to 29 countries and 3 regions, with a cumulative total of 8,422 cases and 916 deaths. This paper describes the spread of the disease in Hong Kong and discusses its impact on the economy. SARS was an unexpected negative shock. The most significant negative effects were on the demand side, with local consumption and the export of services related to tourism and air travel severely affected in the short run. The economy did not experience a supply shock, as the manufacturing base in the Pearl River Delta was unaffected, and goods continued to be exported through Hong Kong normally. Initial alarmist reports and estimates about the negative economic impacts were not borne out. Fear and panic subsided quickly once the outbreak was under control, and the economy rebounded rapidly.
Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) issued a global alert about a deadly new infectious disease on 12 March 2003. Three days later WHO named the disease severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). By 7 August 2003, the disease had spread to 29 countries and 3 regions, with a cumulative total of 8,422 cases and 916 deaths. The most severely affected areas were mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Within mainland China, the areas hardest hit were Guangdong, Beijing, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia. The outbreak started in the Chinese province of Guangdong and was carried to Hong Kong, and from there SARS spread to other parts of the world, including Beijing and other parts of China.
WHO set up a collaborative network of research labs to identify the virus causing SARS. Within weeks of the outbreak in Hong Kong, scientists at The University of Hong Kong had identiªed a new strain of coronavirus as the probable culprit. This virus is highly contagious and can be fatal. Health care workers are particularly at risk of infection. The exact mechanisms of transmission are still in doubt, but the virus seems to be spread by intimate contact through transmission of droplets. One is unlikely to contract SARS from merely being in the vicinity of an infected individual, because the virus does not appear to be airborne; however, the virus can survive on objects such as doorknobs or elevator buttons for more than 24 hours. Hence, it is possible to catch the disease by touching contaminated objects. Wearing face masks and washing hands vigorously using liquid soap are recommended as precautionary measures. There has been no report of transmission of the disease across international borders via contaminated cargo. These features of the virus suggest that quick and effective isolation of infected individuals and quarantine of those who have been in close contact with them are the key measures for limiting the spread of the disease.
Spread of SARS in Hong Kong
SARS ªrst broke out in November 2002 in Foshan, which is near Guangzhou, in the Chinese province of Guangdong. The virus made its way to other parts of the Pearl River Delta by February 2003. China's Ministry of Health informed WHO in midFebruary 2003 of the occurrence in Guangdong province of 305 cases of "atypical pneumonia" and reported that the spread of the illness was "under control." Local media reported the outbreak, and the news spread around the Pearl River Delta region through thousands of cell phone text messages. Hong Kong was alerted by the news that people across the border were stocking up on Chinese herbal medicines and boiling vinegar as a folk remedy to ward off the deadly unknown illness.
Because the world was kept in the dark about the seriousness of the outbreak in Guangdong, Hong Kong was caught unprepared when SARS ªrst appeared in the territory via an elderly medical doctor from Guangzhou who had been treating "atypical pneumonia" patients. The doctor checked into room 911 of the Metropole Hong Kong Hotel on 21 February 2003 to attend a wedding reception, and he was admitted to a nearby hospital the next day. He informed the medical staff that he was highly infectious, and he was promptly isolated. He later died after infecting a nurse in the hospital.
The Guangzhou doctor, during his 1-day stay at the hotel, infected at least 10 other guests staying on the same ºoor of the hotel. All these guests were overseas visitors except for a Hong Kong resident who was visiting the hotel. The infected visitors subsequently ignited outbreaks in Vietnam, Singapore, and Toronto, and the local resident (an airport worker) became the index patient at the Prince of Wales Hospital. The airport worker developed SARS symptoms on 24 February but did not seek treatment at the hospital until 4 March. He was admitted into Ward 8A, where he infected over 100 people, including patients, visitors, medical students, nurses, and doctors. Hospital emergency services had to be suspended temporarily.
In mid-March 2003, the Hong Kong public was told that the outbreak was conªned to hospitals and was not spreading in the community. No isolation measures were adopted; for instance, Prince of Wales Hospital was not cordoned off. The authorities had to face reality when SARS broke out in a multistoried housing estate, Amoy Gardens. On 29 March, 22 of the 45 new SARS cases hospitalized in Hong Kong were residents of Amoy Gardens. On the following day, 36 of the 60 new patients admitted to the hospital with probable SARS were residents of Amoy Gardens, bringing the cumulative total of infected residents to 213. Of these 213 patients, 107 resided in Block E of Amoy Gardens. In addition, most of them lived in ºats that were oriented vertically relative to each other, which suggested that besides close person-to-person contact, SARS might have been spreading by other environmental means.
The Hong Kong Department of Health issued an unprecedented quarantine order to prevent the further spread of SARS in the community. The isolation order required residents of Block E of Amoy Gardens to remain in their ºats for 10 days. When the police carried out the order, they found no one home in well over half of the block's 264 apartments. Residents had learned about the Amoy Gardens outbreak via the media and many had left their homes long before the authorities arrived. SARS was clearly spreading in the community.
Fear of the SARS virus took root in the whole city. Face masks were selling briskly and could be seen everywhere. Public places were disinfected several times a day. People washed their hands much more frequently and avoided going out to crowded places. Restaurants, shops, cinemas, and other entertainment venues were deserted. Many businesses suffered severe losses of income. Schools were ªnally closed to limit the spread of the virus.
All household contacts of conªrmed or suspected SARS patients were required to remain isolated in their homes for monitoring and treatment, up to a maximum of 10 days. At the end of the outbreak, a total of 1,262 persons from 493 households were affected by this isolation order, and 34 of them subsequently came down with SARS (SARS Expert Committee 2003). The government did not compensate the individuals for their conªnement, but it did provide daily necessities and ªnancial assistance. The police enforced the order by checking up on conªned individuals at their homes. Violators were sent warning letters.
Since 29 March 2003, health ofªcials tried to identify travelers who displayed SARS symptoms at the airport and other border control points. All incoming travelers are now required to complete a health declaration form. Temperature checks for all arriving, departing, and transit passengers at the airport were implemented in midApril 2003. Temperature-screening devices were installed at other border control points in late April of that year. As of 7 September, 83 persons had been referred to hospitals for suspected SARS, and 2 of them were later conªrmed to have been infected (SARS Expert Committee 2003) . Since these measures were implemented, no SARS cases have been reported as having originated from Hong Kong.
The SARS outbreak among Amoy Gardens residents and medical staff in Hong Kong peaked by late April 2003 (ªgure 1). At the ªnal count, Hong Kong had a cumulative total of 1,755 SARS cases, accounting for 20.8 percent of the world total of 8,422 cases. Of Hong Kong's total cases, 386 were health care workers, 321 were Amoy Gardens residents, and the rest were from the general community (table 1) . The high number of infected health care workers suggests that to minimize the risk of exposure, all hospital staff must meticulously follow stringent infection control measures. The number of infected health care workers each day was very high during the early days of the outbreak but later declined substantially.
The case mortality rate in Hong Kong, computed by dividing the cumulative number of deaths by the cumulative number of infected cases at the end of the outbreak (the end of June 2003), was 17.0 percent. As a comparison, 13,480 people caught 
Hong Kong's economy when SARS arrived
Since the onset of the Asian ªnancial crisis, Hong Kong's economy has faced an unfavorable external environment. Financial liquidity in Asia drained away in the crisis and its aftermath. Hong Kong's link to the U.S. dollar through a currency board arrangement did not improve matters. The Hong Kong dollar appreciated in value along with the strengthening U.S. dollar during 1999-2002. Investment demand for housing collapsed at the same time that the housing supply began to soar. Although nominal mortgage interest rates were kept low in a globally low-interest-rate environment, the true borrowing cost was high in real terms, with deºation plodding along at 2-4 percent per year (table 3) . Households were struggling to pay down their mortgage debts after the housing-market bubble burst. Domestic consumption was shrinking, and the economy was contracting. Hong Kong's unemployment rate hit record levels, exceeding 7 percent by the end of 2002. The unemployment problem was made worse by the continuous inºow of low-skilled immigrants from mainland China. As the SARS outbreak raged on in China, the economic environment in the region darkened as the prospects of the fastest-growing economy in Asia became cloudy. The uncertain outlook prompted the World Bank to predict that output growth in East Asia would fall by almost 1 percentage point in 2003, to 5 percent (World Bank 2003) . Analysts and rating agencies also revised their forecasts downward (table 4) . On average, private sector analysts estimated that Hong Kong's output growth in 2003 would be 1.2 percentage points lower than previously expected, which translated to a drop of around HK$15 billion in spending on ªnal goods and services in the domestic economy. On 9 April 2003, the government announced that the original forecast of a 3 percent real growth rate in GDP would not be met. Doom and gloom hit the region and Hong Kong. quences from the diversion of foreign investments from the region. Many analysts were also concerned that the disease might recur in 2004.
Economic impact of SARS in Hong Kong

Early predictions and concerns during the SARS shock
The SARS outbreak was an unexpected negative shock to Hong Kong's economy. The most signiªcant negative effects were on the demand side. Local consumption and the export of services related to tourism and air travel were severely affected in the short run. Early anecdotal evidence reported in the press indicated that restaurants and retail outlets were hit hard, with sales dropping by 10 to 50 percent (table 6) . Land transport declined by 10-20 percent because people stayed home. There was also a 50 percent drop in the use of the Airport Express Line, 1 which indicated a reduction in air travel. Fortunately, the supply side of Hong Kong's economy was unaffected. Even though SARS raged through the province of Guangdong, the cross-border manufacturing base was not disrupted. The production and crossborder movement of goods continued to function smoothly, and the global supply chains remained intact.
The stock market reaction to the SARS outbreak was relatively moderate. (table 7). The Hong Kong market surged ahead by 3.7 percent on 29 April, after WHO announced that the worst of the SARS outbreak appeared to be over in Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, and Vietnam. Stock shares of airlines, hotels, property developers, and retailers performed worse than the whole market, whereas shares of export-oriented companies did relatively well (table 8) .
Impact on local consumption
The decline in local consumer spending in Hong Kong stemmed from fears that the disease had spread to the community at large. Consequently, people refrained from many consumption activities outside their homes. The drop in demand rippled through the whole economy: it affected other sectors, put further downward pressure on the price level, and worsened the unemployment problem. The SARS shock started to bite only in late March 2003, based on the March retail sales ªgure, which was HK$14.17 billion, a 6.1 percent drop from the previous year (table 9) . Retail sales in April declined 15.2 percent from the previous year. As the number of new SARS cases started to decline in late April, local residents began venturing out more often. On 1 May, the Labor Day holiday, queues were seen outside some restaurants and cinemas. The consumption pattern also adjusted, with supermarkets and video rental shops doing more business. Retail sales began to recover steadily after those visiting friends or relatives (table 11 ). The number of visitors in the latter two groups recovered more quickly than the number of tourist visitors. The occupancy rate in Hong Kong's hotels dropped dramatically from around 79 percent in early March to 18 percent in early May, but by early July the rate had recovered to 71 percent (ªgure 7).
Impact on tourism and travel
The depressed state of Hong Kong's domestic demand since 1999 was partially offset by increased demand by tourists. Total spending by tourists had dropped off dramatically between 1997 and 1998, at the onset of the Asian ªnancial crisis (table  12) , but since then it has grown at an average annual rate of 8 percent, largely because of the increasing number of visitors from mainland China resulting from the more relaxed restrictions on travel to Hong Kong. 
Impact on exports and re-exports of goods
The fear that the SARS outbreak would cause a fall in Hong Kong's goods exports and re-exports was not borne out: cross-border truck trafªc ªgures showed no obvious decrease between March and September 2003 (ªgure 8 Sources: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong (2003a) and Hong Kong Tourism Board (2003) .
2 Under the Individual Visit Scheme commenced on 28 July 2003, residents of four Guangdong cities could travel to Hong Kong as individual visitors. Previously, they had to join a tour group to visit Hong Kong. The scheme was introduced by the Chinese government as a measure to revive Hong Kong's economy and was subsequently extended to Beijing, Shanghai, and the whole of Guangdong province. Beijing's policy is to extend the scheme further by including more cities. No major production disruptions were reported in factories in the Pearl River Delta, which are mostly owned by Hong Kong-based manufacturing and trading companies. Most factory hands employed in the manufacturing operations in this area are migrant workers who live in employer-provided hostels. This arrangement probably helped to insulate these workers from SARS in the nearby community. The effects of the curtailment of travel to the region by employees of overseas companies was mitigated by the return of business travelers after the SARS outbreak was over and by the increased level of travel by local businessmen to meet with their overseas clients.
Impacts on unemployment and deºation
The combined effects of the drop in domestic consumption and the decrease in tourist spending worsened what was already a weak labor market in Hong Kong. Unemployment and underemployment rates rose throughout the SARS outbreak ( sharing schemes in the face of lower demand. The underemployment rate started to decrease in July, and the unemployment rate showed signs of falling in August.
The consumer price index continued to show a negative growth rate throughout the SARS outbreak (table 14) . The declines were more severe after the SARS outbreak had started to abate, reºecting attempts by retailers, restaurants, and others to entice consumers to spend.
Concluding remarks
The initial alarmist reports and estimates about the impacts of SARS have not been borne out by the actual statistics. The economic impacts of SARS on consumption, tourism, and travel-related services turned out to be relatively short-lived. Fear and panic subsided quickly once the outbreak abated. The stock market's overall response mirrored these developments well: most of the short-term negative effects were concentrated in sectors that were severely hit by the negative demand shock. There was no major disruption to external trade, especially for the re-exporting of goods from mainland China. The manufacturing base in the Pearl River Delta was unaffected, and goods continued to ºow through Hong Kong normally. The Hong Kong economy did not experience a supply-side shock. We ªnd no anecdotal evidence to indicate that SARS had negative effects on either domestic or foreign investment.
The possibility that the virus will return in 2004 cannot be ruled out. Mainland China and Hong Kong will be much better prepared, however, especially with the knowledge that the virus is not airborne and can therefore be contained if quarantine measures are quickly and meticulously implemented. in hospitals is likely to be better handled, with enhanced infection isolation facilities, infection control procedures, and heightened vigilance.
The fact that the disease raged on for several months without attracting worldwide attention reveals the damaging effects of information control in relatively closed societies that do not have a free press. The spread of SARS to Hong Kong, with the ªrst case in a hotel, was very unfortunate, but it may also have been critical in focusing public attention on the potential global threat posed by the virus. The media in Hong Kong were the ªrst to raise public alarm by candidly reporting the facts. The spread of the disease to several countries (notably Vietnam, Singapore, and Canada) brought world attention to the issues that SARS was a deadly new disease and was spreading quickly, and that authorities in mainland China had failed to report in a timely manner a serious epidemic. The free ºow of information and the reactions that followed played an important role in stopping the spread of the disease. The Chinese government responded quickly to contain the spread of SARS in the wake of international public pressure. Research that led to the early identiªcation of the virus at The University of Hong Kong and of some of the properties of the disease calmed the public's fears and may have helped avert an uncontrolled panic by investors and the serious economic impacts that would have followed.
If a recurrence of the disease is controlled effectively, then Hong Kong's close economic relationship with the mainland will not be affected by such a recurrence. Another SARS outbreak could even help to speed up the opening of the mainland, for the ªrst experience demonstrated to the Chinese leadership that GDP numbers depend on the conªdence of domestic and international economic agents. 
